The biggest story of the elections in San Francisco was Daniel Lurie winning the race for mayor. Lurie became the first person to defeat a sitting mayor since Willie Brown stymied Frank Jordan’s bid for reelection in 1995. Jordan, in turn, was one of the first high profile politicians to endorse Lurie’s bid for mayor.

Lurie was one of four major candidates in the race. In addition to Breed, Lurie defeated Mark Farrell, running from the right and Aaron Peskin from the left. Lurie won by presenting himself as a smart, polished and well-spoken youngish man with an attractive family and a clear devotion to his hometown. That was not difficult for Lurie as he genuinely is all those things. Former Mayor Art Agnos described Lurie as somebody who would make a great son-in-law. It was meant as a back-handed compliment, but it is also true and ultimately was key to Lurie’s victory.

Lurie ran as a nice guy who despite his affluent upbringing was friendly and accessible. That was a contrast to Farrell, the darling of conservative new moneyed San Francisco, who presented himself as a strongman and finished last among the major candidates. Lurie’s nice guy image was a major reason why the attacks on him, many coming from Farrell and his backers, never got much traction.

Naturally, there is more to the story than that; about fifteen million more things. Among those things is the amount of money Lurie, and independent expenditures supporting him, spent on this race. Had he outspent Peskin and Breed by only about 2-1, Lurie probably would not have won. It is very likely that in that scenario, Peskin, who had the most momentum over the last few weeks of the campaign, would have won. However, Lurie, a scion of the Levi’s fortune, was mostly self-funded, outspending Peskin by about 5-1, and that proved to be too much for Peskin to overcome.

Of the four major candidates, Lurie was the most intriguing in that it was least clear what his mayoralty would look like. One easily can imagine Lurie becoming a new, and less corrupt, iteration of the Breed model, which is really the Feinstein model, of governing San Francisco, a hybrid of being liberal on social issues and conservative on economic ones. It is also possible that Lurie will shift rightward and turn the city over to conservative tech and real estate interests and oversee upzoning of many parts of the city.

On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that Lurie will surprise some people and, despite never having a job as most of us understand that word, prove to be an effective hands-on manager, making the city run more effectively while pursuing data- and evidence-based solutions to problems. On balance, Lurie was something of a Rorschach test for voters, so we will have to wait until he takes office or begins making appointments before we know what kind of mayor he will be.

Lurie will have one major advantage when he takes office. The doom loop narrative, which was largely a creation of the media and the right-wing Astroturf Network of GrowSF, Neighbors for a Better San Francisco, TogetherSF and others, was defeated by the voters. Farrell was the doom loop candidate. Not only did he lose badly, but Proposition D, the TogetherSF backed attempt to radically remake city government through eviscerating accountability and oversight, also lost badly. In general, the radical change the doom loop was developed to facilitate was rejected by the voters along with the narrative itself.

While Lurie’s victory may get the headlines, the biggest story of the election may be the setbacks that the Astroturf Network experienced. Overall, the network spent more than $12 million on elections this cycle and had very little to show for it.

In addition to their chosen candidate, Mark Farrell, whose campaign TogetherSF all but ran, stumbling into fourth place due to a bevy of scandals, a lack of charisma and a message that was too far right, ballot initiatives went about as badly as possible for the Network. In addition to the failure of Proposition D, Proposition C, which was Peskin’s call for an inspector general, passed easily. Proposition E, Peskin’s alternative and far more nuanced and democratic proposal for commission reform also passed. The outcome of the rest of the ballot initiatives also clearly reflected progressive strength in San Francisco.

While the Astroturf Network put a lot of money into these races with little to show for it, Michael Moritz, the billionaire backer of TogetherSF, had a particularly bad election season. Not only did Mark Farrell’s candidacy implode and take Prop D down with it, but the last few weeks of the campaign were particularly humiliating for Moritz. On October 16th, Moritz had a public tantrum in the opinion section of the New York Times in which he blamed Peskin for all of San Francisco’s problems. In fairness, Moritz did not blame the 49ers’ slow start on Peskin, but it would have surprised few people if he did.

Moritz’s article, like much of the communication from TogetherSF and other similar groups, was shoddily researched, misleading and ahistorical. The opinion piece backfired spectacularly for Moritz as it led to a spate of bad publicity and contributed to Peskin’s momentum which, among other things, pushed Farrell into fourth place. Being on the receiving end of the largest ethics fine in San Francisco history the day before the election was then just insult to injury. 

The elections for six of the eleven seats of the Board of Supervisors tell a bit more of a complex story. The Astroturf Network won in District 3 where Danny Sauter replaced Peskin, but the biggest win for the Astroturf Network was in District 5 where progressive stalwart Dean Preston was defeated by Bilal Mahmood. That victory was due almost entirely to the Network spending $300,000 on an anti-Preston campaign, on top of the nearly $500,000 raised by Mahmood himself.

While Preston’s defeat is a big blow for progressives, in other parts of the city progressives won despite the Network throwing enormous amounts of money into efforts to defeat them. In District 1 incumbent Supervisor Connie Chan beat Network backed candidate Marjan Philhour. Similarly, in District 7 Myrna Melgar won reelection against a Network favorite. In District 9 Jackie Fielder trounced Network darling Trevor Chandler. In District 11, Chyanne Chan edged out Michael Lai who enjoyed ample support from the Network.

Thwarting Network efforts in four of six contests for the Board of Supervisors and on all the major initiatives is evidence that one of the major accomplishments of the Network this cycle was to reinvigorate the left in San Francisco.

There are a few things this election shows us. First, the Astroturf Network, at least for now, works best when it remains in the shadows. Their biggest successes have come in low turnout elections such as the recalls they forced and campaigns for obscure offices like the Democratic County Central Committee. More significantly, over the last 12 months the network was outed as a right-wing billionaire project – and the voters of San Francisco rejected that. 

The days when GrowSF or Neighbors for a Better San Francisco could disingenuously present themselves as good governance civic organizations are now firmly in the past. In the bigger picture, the Network is not going away, as evidenced by the nefarious longer term goals for San Francisco they have already articulated, but the glide path to victory they thought they were on has been disrupted.

In this election cycle, neither the Astroturf Network nor progressives can claim a full victory in San Francisco. In the race for mayor, Peskin, the progressive candidate, did significantly better than the Network’s favorite son Mark Farrell. In the first round Peskin trailed eventual winner Lurie by fewer votes than Farrell trailed Peskin. However the eventual winner, Lurie, won the old-fashioned way: he bought it — and for good measure, mostly with old money. The Astroturf Network only won two of the six contested races for the Board of Supervisors. Similarly, the outcomes of the initiatives were a major victory for progressive and an even bigger defeat for the network.

By the time of the election Michael Moritz had emerged, more than any single individual, as the face of the Network, so I will summarize this in language that speaks to Moritz’s obsession: Peskin may have lost, but Peskinism did a lot better than Moritz’s candidates and causes.